Millions of those who pray, go to church, and believe in God do so, I suspect, from the sense "better safe than sorry"; and among philosophers too Pascal's wager enjoys significant support. The reason for this is that the Many Gods Objection is widely dismissed out of hand though sometimes deliberatively so, as by Schlesinger 1977, 1988 & 1994, Lycan & Schlesinger 1989, and Jordan 1991, 1993 & 1994. It has been argued, for example, that religious hypotheses ought to be considered only if they are traditional and "genuine" options. But this defense of Pascal fails in two ways. First, it is a mistake to automatically reject non-traditional and artifactual options as epistemic possibilities. Second, even if we grant a restriction to traditional and genuine options, Buddhism and other sincerely held religious hypotheses remain which defeat Pascal's decision-theoretic argument for believing in God.
For an on-line account of Pascal's wager, see my article in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.